Industrial policy to develop a multi-firm industry by Melkonyan, Tigran A. et al.
  
 
 
 
  warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Melkonyan, Tigran A., Banks, Dwayne and Wendel, Jeanne (2017) Industrial policy to develop 
a multi-firm industry.Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 17 (3). pp. 283-
303. doi:10.1007/s10842-016-0242-z 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/97946  
       
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work of researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. 
 
This article is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International 
license (CC BY 4.0) and may be reused according to the conditions of the license.  For more 
details see: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/   
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented in WRAP is the published version, or, version of record, and may be 
cited as it appears here. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
Industrial Policy to Develop a Multi-Firm Industry
Tigran Melkonyan1 & Dwayne Banks2 & Jeanne Wendel3
Received: 11 August 2016 /Revised: 27 November 2016
Accepted: 21 December 2016 /Published online: 23 January 2017
# The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Governments face pressure to act when coordination and learning externalities
block development of otherwise-profitable industries that would produce merit goods for the
domestic market. A short-term subsidy that offsets these externalities could potentially jump-
start a multi-firm industry, if the subsidy induces a pioneer firm to enter and then the pioneer’s
first-period output generates coordination and learning externalities. These externalities could
induce subsequent entry by input suppliers and/or competitors. However, empirical evidence
raises questions about the ability of governments to use short-term subsidies to jump-start new
industries. We explore one explanation for the difficulty of jump-starting new industries: the
subsidy could generate counter-productive incentives for the pioneer firm to prevent entry of
additional firms. We model the jump-start strategy and examine whether coupling a short-term
fixed subsidy with a per-unit subsidy can achieve the objective of creating a multi-firm
industry.
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1 Introduction
Learning externalities and coordination failures can create stalemates that block the develop-
ment of otherwise profitable industries, if pioneer entrants incur first-mover costs to develop
new production or distribution methods, organize new supply networks, or educate potential
customers about a new product, while subsequent entrants enjoy external benefits generated by
the pioneer’s efforts (Krugman 1987; Romero-Martínez and Montoro-Sánchez 2008). Poten-
tial entrants may respond to this first-mover disadvantage by waiting for their counterparts to
enter first, and, as a result, potentially-profitable industries may not develop.
If the blocked industry would produce a merit good (such as electric cars, solar energy,
electronic exchange of health information, fuel cell buses, or new types of healthcare in a
developing country), advocacy groups may pressure the government to overcome this market
failure. The political appeal of this position is enhanced by the presumption that the coordi-
nation and learning-externality market failures are short-term problems that can be addressed
with a targeted short-term subsidy. This subsidy would be designed to induce initial entry, by
compensating the pioneer for activities that generate learning externalities and obviate coor-
dination failures. The resulting pioneer entry then creates the conditions that induce subsequent
entry by additional firms. This strategy offers two attractive features:
& It limits government involvement in the industry to the initial stages of industry develop-
ment, without enmeshing the government in an ongoing effort to influence the industry’s
evolution.
& It also allows the government to side-step the question of whether it can take on long-term
financial commitments.
However, efforts to jump-start a merit-good industry face a tougher challenge than more
traditional efforts to jump-start export-industries. Subsidy design for jump-starting an export
industry can focus on inducing entry by a pioneer producer, followed by subsequent entry by
complementary firms such as input suppliers. Subsidy design for jump-starting a domestic
merit-good industry must accomplish this goal, while also inducing subsequent entry by
competitive firms that will mitigate the initial market power enjoyed by the pioneer entrant.
Despite these challenges, the straightforwardmarket-failure logic and the apparent simplicity of
designing a short-term subsidy to ameliorate these market-failures have enticed governments to
attempt jump-starting numerous industries. The Dubai Health Care City (DHCC) provides a rich
example, because large-scale pioneer entry was expected to lead to lower operating costs for
subsequent entrants that would deliver both competitive services and complementary services.
DHCC was designed to provide high-quality healthcare in both the Bexport^ medical tourism
market and in the domestic healthcare market. Domestic availability of new types of high-quality
healthcare was viewed as amerit good that would provide essential infrastructure to support efforts
to induce foreign firms to relocate professional employees to Dubai. Providing a short-term
subsidy to induce pioneer entry raised the question: is it possible to subsidize entry of a high-
quality hospital without creating a first-mover advantage that would deter subsequent entry by
additional organizations? Due to coordination and learning market failures, the pioneer faced first-
mover challenges: medical and nursing schools were not available to provide locally-trained
personnel to staff the new hospital, local pharmaceutical and medical supply chains were not well-
developed, and the network of local ancillary healthcare service-providers (such as nursing
facilities) was not well-developed. These challenges implied that the pioneer would incur first-
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mover costs, and they also implied that construction and operation of a large-scale pioneer facility
was likely to generate subsequent entry by medical and nursing schools, pharmaceutical and
medical supply distribution companies, entities providing ancillary healthcare services. Develop-
ment of these infrastructure industries could induce subsequent entry by additional hospitals that
would compete with the pioneer. Thus, pioneer entry was expected to induce entry by comple-
mentary firms, and this entry was expected to reduce hospital operating costs. The resulting
reduction in operating costs was expected to induce competitive entry by additional hospitals, if
the short-term subsidies offered to the pioneer entrant could be crafted to offset the firm-mover
costs, without creating a long-term first-mover advantage. Consistent with this logic, Harvard
Medical School announced plans in 2015 to partner with entities in Dubai to open a high-quality
medical school and research facility, and Cleveland Clinic Abu Dhabi was opened in 2015.
The desire to accomplish this goal is not unique to DHCC. The U.S. government has funded
targeted subsidies for firms developing products to meet an array of social goals, including
development and diffusion of battery technology for electric cars, health information technol-
ogy, fuel cell buses, and retail developments (Dearlove 2001; Kelly 2010). For example:
& Tesla’s entry into the electric car and battery industries has benefited from substantial
federal and state subsidies (Wills 2014). The subsidized battery factory under construction
in Nevada is expected to produce batteries that will support development of the electric car
and solar power generation industries. If the subsidy strategy succeeds, this battery factory
will induce subsequent entry by complementary firms that produce inputs into the battery
production process and by firms that will contract with these suppliers to produce batteries
in direct competition with Tesla.
& Short-term subsidies to spur development of nationwide Health Information Exchange
(HIE) were included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) 2009.
Blumenthal (2006) argued that Health Information Exchange (HIE) is a merit good that
could provide the supporting infrastructure needed to increase efficiency in the U.S.
healthcare industry, but development of the industry was blocked by coordination and
learning externalities.1 Subsidies were provided to one pioneer HIE in each state, and
federal policy explicitly stated that states should not block subsequent entrants into the HIE
industry. It was anticipated that the pioneer HIE activities would spur adoption of
complementary activities, including hospital and physician utilization of electronic medical
records and healthcare payer utilization of population-health analytics. These complemen-
tary activities have merit-good characteristics, because they are expected to generate new
types of efficiencies in the provision of healthcare services.
& The U.S. Supreme Court’s controversial 2005 Kelo decision allows local governments to
provide indirect subsidies to an individual firm, through the eminent domain process
(Eagle 2009). The logic underlying this decision hinges on the expectation that market
entry by the subsidized firm will generate benefits that induce subsequent entry by
additional suppliers, customers and competitors. One component of the controversy
generated by this decision focuses on the question of whether it is realistic to assume that
the subsequent entry, and the hoped-for cost-reductions and price competition, will
actually occur.
1 Physician adoption of electronic medical records systems was low, partly because the infrastructure was not
available to support exchange of electronic information among physician practices, and firms were not offering
HIE services because most physicians did not have any electronic information to exchange.
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Despite the optimism embedded in these policies, the Pack and Saggi (2006) review of
efforts to jump-start new industries (also known as sectoral targeting) concludes: BFew of the
empirical analyses find that sectoral targeting has been particularly effective.^ Grossman
(1989), Pack and Saggi (2006), and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) provide three potential explana-
tions for this lack of evidence of successful implementation:
& political and rent-seeking pressures may push governments to target the short-term
subsidies to industries that do not exhibit the characteristics defined by the market-
failure models,
& governments may not have sufficient information to accurately forecast the social value of
developing technologies, or
& the initial short-term subsidy of the pioneer entrant may create a monopolist that blocks
subsequent competitive entry by competitors and produces a suboptimal quantity of the
merit good.
We focus on the third issue. We specify a two-period model in which the pioneer
entrant’s first period output reduces the second period production costs of both the
pioneer and the potential subsequent entrant, due to knowledge gained through produc-
tion experience, development of an efficient infrastructure for obtaining inputs, or
education of potential customers.
The closely-related literatures on strategic trade policy and industrial policy provide the
starting point for our model (Fudenberg and Tirole 1984, 1986; Neary and Leahy 2000;
Pflüger and Südekum 2013). Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Neary and Leahy (2000) model
output decisions of incumbent firms, focusing on entry and output decisions made by firms
selling in both the domestic and Bforeign^ markets. Our model is similar, in spirit, to the Neary
and Leahy (2000) framework in which the government cannot commit to future actions.
However, we focus on a different question. Neary and Leahy (2000) model an industry with
one Bhome^ firm and one Bforeign^ firm, in which the home firm exports all of its output to
compete against the Bforeign^ firm. In their model, the government seeks to maximize social
welfare at Bhome^, where the social welfare is equal to the present value of the Bhome^ firm’s
profit. (See Pflüger and Südekum (2013) for additional analysis of policy designed to give
domestic firms a competitive advantage in trade.)
We focus on a different situation; we model government policy designed to trigger
development of a new merit good industry, that will produce and sell its output at
Bhome^. The policy goal is to induce a pioneer to enter (and create) the new industry,
and to produce a level of first-period output that will induce subsequent entry by a
second firm. Entry by the second firm is an important component of the policy goal:
jump-starting the development of an efficient supply-chain infrastructure generates the
cost reduction needed for long-term production of the merit-good, and jump-starting the
development of a new multi-firm industry avoids the issues raised by monopoly provi-
sion of the merit good. We define a parameter that indicates the relationship between the
outputs of the pioneer and subsequent entrant along the continuum between perfect
complements and perfect substitutes. We derive two sets of results, that describe subsidy
design to induce entry by an entrant that will produce complementary goods, and design
that will induce competitive entry.
Our model focuses on a potential merit good industry, with two potential entrants: the
pioneer will not enter in the first period without a subsidy, and the subsequent entrant will not
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enter without the cost reductions generated by the pioneer. These cost reductions stem from a
diverse array of coordination and learning activities, and we streamline the remaining discus-
sion by defining the term Blearning^ to encompass the full set of these activities. We assume
that policy-makers have already concluded that jump-starting the new industry will generate a
net benefit, and we examine conditions that determine whether the jump-start strategy will be
successful. We examine the impact of a one-time intervention, designed to induce the entry
needed to jumpstart development of an industrial complex of two firms producing comple-
mentary products or a new duopolistic industry comprised of two competitive firms. The
volume of output produced by the pioneer entrant plays a key role in the design of both types
of subsidies. Pioneer output quantity must exceed a threshold, to induce entry by complemen-
tary firms, while analysis of the output needed to induce competitive entry is more complex
because the pioneer may engage in strategic behavior to solidify its initial monopoly position.
We analyze whether such entry deterrence can be prevented by complementing the fixed
subsidy with a one-period variable subsidy or tax.
2 The Model
We model a two-period game, in which the government acts as a Stackelberg leader,
announcing fixed and variable subsidies to induce entry by the pioneer firm (firm A). If firm
A elects to enter the market, this pioneer entrant assumes the role of a Stackelberg leader,
deciding how much to produce in the first production period with full awareness of the impact
of period-1 output on the subsequent strategic interaction that will occur in period 2 between
the pioneer (firm A) and the potential entrant (firm B). If the second firm enters in period 2, the
two firms use Cournot strategies at that point in time. Thus, the government exerts direct
influence on the production choice of the pioneer firm in period 1, but the government does not
manage the competitive process directly in period 2. Instead, it influences the period-2 outputs
of the firms indirectly (through its influence on the pioneer’s initial output). The strategic
interaction between the three parties is specified in the following timeline:
Period 1:
Date 1 The government chooses the levels of lump-sum (S) and per unit (v) subsidies, to
induce firm A to enter the market.
Date 2 Firm A decides whether to enter the new market and chooses its level of period-1
production upon entry.
Period 2:
Date 3 Provided firm A entered the market in period 1, firm B decides whether to enter
the market, and, subsequently, firm A learns about firm B’s entry decision.
Date 4 If firm B enters, the two firms choose their production levels simultaneously and
independently, using Cournot strategies. If firm B does not enter, firm A chooses
the monopoly level of production.
The firms face inverse demand functions, Pi
t = Pi(Qi
t,Qj
t), where Qi
t denotes the output of
firm i in period t, the superscript t = 1, 2 denotes the time period, and the subscript i = A, B
denotes the pioneer entrant (firm A) and the potential second entrant (firm B). Demand is
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assumed to be stationary across time to economize on notation. All functional forms in our
model are twice-continuously differentiable in all of their arguments.,2 3
The second firm does not contemplate entry in period 1, because unsubsidized entry
does not generate positive profits until learning occurs and firm B is not eligible for the
targeted subsidy; hence QB
1 = 0. It is also assumed that if firm A finds it unprofitable to
enter in period 1, then firm B will stay out of the market in period 2. Finally, firm A is
assumed to remain in the market in period 2, if it was profitable for firm A to enter the
market in period 1.
The pioneer firm faces relatively high production costs due to the absence of a well-
developed network of suppliers, a shortage of potential employees with the specific skills
needed by the new industry, and/or an innovator’s steep learning curve. The pioneer
firm’s period-1 production activity provides the incentives and information needed to
begin resolving these issues, and we coin all three types of problem-resolution as
Blearning^. This Blearning^ may be completely internal to the pioneer, in which case
the pioneer’s period-1 output only generates a period-2 cost reduction for the pioneer.
Alternatively, some of the Blearning^ may be shared by firm B, so that the new
competitor firm splits the benefits from the pioneer’s increased output in period 1. Thus,
if both firms decide to enter the market, they may be linked via two mechanisms; the
pioneer’s period-1 output impacts the cost functions of both firms and the two firms sell
goods that are either substitutes or complements.
The pioneer firm’s cost function is cA
1(QA
1) in period 1 and the two firms’ period-2
cost functions are represented by ci
2(Qi
2,QA
1) because both firms can potentially learn
from firm A’s experience in period 1. The additional conditions that ∂cA1/∂QA1, ∂2cA2/
∂QA2∂QA1, ∂cB2/∂QA1 ⋅ ∂2cB2/∂QB2/∂QA1 ≤ 0 reflect our assumption that increases in firm A’s
period-1 output generate learning that reduces both firms’ total and marginal costs in
period 2. Firm A may potentially learn more than firm B, if most of the learning
remains internal to firm A; hence the magnitudes of ∂cA2/∂QA1 and ∂2cA2/∂QA2∂QA1 may be
larger than the magnitudes of ∂cB2/∂QA1 and ∂2cB2/∂QB2∂QA1, respectively. We also assume
that the cost functions satisfy the usual curvature properties given by ∂cA1/∂(QA1)2, ∂2cA2/
∂(QA2)2, ∂2cB2/∂(QB2)2 > 0. Finally, the pioneer and second entrant incur entry costs EA and
EB, respectively.
Our analysis of certain elements of the strategic interaction for Dates 2 through 4
(summarized in Lemmas 1 and 2) is similar to Fudenberg and Tirole (1984, 1986).4
The main innovation of the present work relative to the received literature on strategic
entry deterrence lies in the modeling of the government’s choices. Thus, the main value
added of the paper from the technical point of view is contained in Sections 3.3 and
3.4. Since the analysis of the components of the game contained in these sections is
interrelated with the other stages, we present an analysis of all parts of the strategic
interaction. We focus on the implications of the strategic interaction for the feasibility
of the jump-start strategy; hence we skip most of the steps in the exposition of the
analysis common with Fudenberg and Tirole (1984, 1986), and we relegate the tech-
nical details to Appendix.
2 Our results remain valid in a framework where the demand for firm A’s product changes over time.
3 It is also assumed that the profit functions of both firms are strictly concave.
4 Our modeling of the spillover of firm A’s period-1 output on choices in period 1 is slightly more general than
that in Fudenberg and Tirole’s model; however the mechanics of these models are applicable.
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3 Equilibrium Behavior: Implications for the Jump-Start Strategy
We solve the game backward, beginning with the proper subgames that start at Date 4. The
sequence of subgame solutions permits us to analyze the impact of firm A’s period-1 output on
the period-2 Nash equilibrium outputs, on firm B’s profit and entry decision, and on the
feasibility of the jump-start strategy.
3.1 Impact of the First Period Output on Production Decisions in Period 2 (Date 4)
If firm A enters the market in period 1 and firm B enters the market in period 2, the period-2
profits of firms A and B are given by:
π2i Q
1
i ;Q
2
i ;Q
2
j
 
¼ Ri Q2i ;Q2j
 
−c2i Q
2
i ;Q
2
j
 
−Ei ð1Þ
where Ri(Qi
2,Qj
2) denotes player i’s revenue, j ≠ i, and QB1 = 0. When both firms are in the
market in period 2, they compete in a Cournot fashion. The Nash equilibrium Q^
2
A Q
1
A
 
; Q^
2
B
Q1A
 Þ of the Date-4 subgame is given by the solution to:
∂RA Q^
2
A; Q^
2
B
 
∂Q2A
¼
∂cA Q^
2
A; ∂Q
1
A
 
∂Q2A
and
∂RB Q^
2
B; Q^
2
A
 
∂Q2B
¼
∂cB Q^
2
B; ∂Q
1
A
 
∂Q2B
ð2Þ
We assume that an interior solution exists, and the Nash Equilibrium is asymptotically
stable. The asymptotic stability requires ∂MRA=∂Q
2
B
SODA
⋅ ∂MRB=∂Q
2
A
SODB
< 1 S for all (QA
2,QB
2) in some
open neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium of the date-4 subgame (Fudenberg and Tirole
1991), where SODi represents the second-order derivative of firm i’s profit with respect to own
output, and the term MRi represents marginal revenue for firm i.
If firm B stays out in period 2, then firm Awill choose the monopoly output level Q
2
A Q
1
A
 
given by
∂RA Q
2
A; 0
 
∂Q2A
¼
∂c2A Q
2
A;Q
1
A
 
∂Q2A
ð3Þ
The jump-start strategy focuses on the impact of QA
1 on the period 2 outputs of firms A and
B. As detailed in the following lemma, when the goods are substitutes, outputs chosen the by
firms A and B depend on the ratio of external to internal learning. Internal learning, given by
LA ¼ ∂2c2B Q^
2
B;Q
1
A
 
=∂Q2A∂Q
1
A, measures the impact of the pioneer’s period-1 activities on the
pioneer’s own marginal cost curve in period 2. External learning, given by LA ¼ ∂2c2B
Q^
2
B;Q
1
A
 
=∂Q2B∂Q
1
A, measures the impact of the pioneer’s period-1 activities on firm B’s
period-2 marginal cost curve. We have:
Lemma 1: Impact of the first period output on production decisions in period 2
(a) If the goods are complements, then an increase in firm A’s output in period 1 will result in
an increase in the outputs of both firms in period 2.
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(b) If the goods are substitutes, then an increase in firm A’s period-1 output will result in:
(b-i) increases in the outputs of both firms in period 2 if and only if
∂MRB
.
∂Q2A
SODA
≤
LB
LA
≤
SODB
∂MRA
.
∂Q2B
ð4Þ
(b-ii) a decrease in firm A’s period-2 output and an increase in firm B’s period-2 output if
and only if the ratio of external learning to internal learning exceeds a threshold:
SODB
∂MRA
.
∂Q2B
≤
LB
LA
ð5Þ
(b-iii) an increase in firm A’s period-2 output and a decrease in firm B’s period-2 output
if and only if the ratio of external learning to internal learning is low:
LB
LA
≤
∂MRB
.
∂Q2A
SODA
ð6Þ
Furthermore, it is never the case that an increase in firm A’s period-1 output
results in decreases in period-2 outputs of both firms.5
Proof: See Appendix
Lemma 1 highlights the critical role of the relationship between learning that is shared
by firm B and learning that remains internal to firm A: the ratio of these two variables
defines the conditions under which QA
1 exerts positive (or negative) impacts on period-2
Nash equilibrium outputs Q^
2
A and Q^
2
B, when both firms are in the market in period 2. The
magnitude of firm B’s period-2 output is important because policy-makers employ the
jump-start strategy to develop industries that produce merit goods. This implies that
policy-makers value industry growth, along with low production costs and competitive
pricing.
The result summarized in Lemma 1 can be interpreted graphically, by considering the
impacts of period-1 output on the best-response curves. When the goods produced by the two
firms are strategic complements (Bulow et al. 1985), an increase in QA
1 results in a downward
shift of firm A’s best response curve and an upward shift of firm B’s best response curve. As a
result, the new Nash equilibrium involves higher production by both firms. This result is a
basic property of supermodular games (Topkis 1979, 1998; Bulow et al. 1985; Milgrom and
Roberts 1990; Vives 1990).
In the case of strategic substitutes, the effects of QA
1 on the period-2 production levels are
ambiguous. The downward-sloping best-response curves of both firms shift upward as a result
of an increase in QA
1. The relationship between the original and new Nash equilibria depends
on the relative magnitude of the two upward shifts and the curvature of the best-response
curves. The shifts are driven by the ratio of external to internal learning: the more each firm
Blearns^ the greater the shift of its best response curve. Each curve’s upward shift will tend to
5 All of the expressions in the inequalities (4), (5) and (6) are evaluated at the Cournot output levels from (2).
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increase that firm’s Nash equilibrium production level and decrease its counterpart’s produc-
tion. Because both firms Blearn^ and the two firms’ Blearning^ work in opposite directions, the
total effect is ambiguous.
In summary, the period-2 outputs of both firms are increasing functions of firm A’s
period-1 production when the pioneer and the subsequent entrant produce complemen-
tary good. When the two firms produce substitutes, however, the impact of firm A’s
period-1 production on second-period output hinges on the relationship between internal
and external learning. Firm A’s period-2 production increases when (i) firm B’s external
learning is low (LB/LA) is relatively small), (ii) firm B’s best response is relatively
unresponsive to changes in firm A’s output, and (iii) the marginal effect of firm A’s
period-2 output on the marginal revenue of firm B is large compared to the marginal
effect of firm B’s period-2 output on the marginal revenue of firm A. Analogous results
hold for firm B. It also follows from Lemma 1 that the increased period-1 output will
only trigger period-2 expansion of both QA
2 andQB
2 when the internal-learning ratio is
bounded by the ratios of the impacts of QA
2 on the two firms’ profits and the impacts of
QB
2 on the two firms’ profits.,6 7
3.2 Impact of Period-1 Output on Firm B’s Entry Decision (Date 3)
Firm B’s entry decision is a critical target of the jump-start strategy. Firm B’s profit is
negative when QA
1 = 0 by assumption, and firm B will only enter in period 2 if it
anticipates earning a positive profit. Given QA
1, firm B will enter the market at Date 3
if and only if:
πB ¼ RB Q^
2
A Q
1
A
 
; Q^
2
B Q
1
A
  
−cB Q^
2
B Q
1
A
 
;Q1A
 
−EB≥0 ð7Þ
Differentiating (7) with respect to QA
1 and using (2) we obtain:
dπB
dQ1A
¼ −
∂cB Q^
2
B Q
1
A
 
;Q1A
 
∂Q1A
þ
∂RB Q^
2
A Q
1
A
 
; Q^
2
B Q
1
A
  
∂Q2A
dQ^
2
A Q
1
A
 
dQ1A
ð8Þ
where
dQ^
2
A
Q1Að Þ
dQ1A
is characterized in Lemma 1. This expression reveals that an increase in QA
1
exerts direct and indirect impacts on firm B’s period-2 profit: the direct effect of Blearning^
on πB given by the first term in (8) and the strategic effect given by the second term in (8),
respectively (Fudenberg and Tirole 1984). The direct impact of QA
1 on firm B’s period-2 profit
is positive. If the goods produced by the two firms are complements, then the strategic effect is
also positive. If the goods are substitutes, the direction of the strategic effect depends on the
sign of
dQ^
2
A Q
1
Að Þ
dQ1A
. When
dQ^
2
A Q
1
Að Þ
dQ1A
< 0, the impact of QA
1 on πB is unambiguously positive.
6 For readers familiar with the Neary-Leahy conceptual framework, our scenario roughly corresponds to the
Neary-Leahy case of Bresearch and development with spillovers between firms^, with the exception that we
focus on a different policy goal.
7 Note that part (b) of Lemma 1 is a local result since the relative rankings of the terms in (4), (5) and (6) are
functions of firm A’s first period output.
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However, when
dQ^
2
A Q
1
Að Þ
dQ1A
< 0, the impact of QA
1 on πB depends on the relative magnitudes of
the direct and strategic effects. We detail this result in Lemma 2:
Lemma 2: Impact of QA
1 on firm B’s profit
(a) If the goods produced by firms A and B are complements, then firm B’s profit is
increasing in QA
1. Hence, firm B will enter if and only if firm A’s output in period 1 is
sufficiently large.8
(b) If the goods produced by firms A and B are substitutes, then dπB
dQ1A
> 0 if and only if
LASODB−LB ∂MRA
.
∂Q2B
 
SODASODB− ∂MRA
.
∂Q2B
 
∂MRB
.
∂Q2A
  ≤ ∂cB
.
∂Q1A
∂RB
.
∂Q2A
ð9Þ
which is satisfied when dQ^
2
A
dQ1A
≤0.
The magnitude of the right-hand-side of inequality (9) depends on the two pathways
through which firm A’s activities impact firm B’s profit: Firm A’s period-1 output generates
learning that reduces firm B’s second-period cost, while firm A’s period-2 output affects the
demand for firm B’s product. When the two goods are substitutes, the condition dQ^
2
A
dQ1A
≤0 from
Lemma 1 is sufficient, but not necessary, to ensure that inequality (9) is satisfied. If dQ^
2
A
dQ1A
≤0,
policy makers can assume that subsidies designed to increase QA
1 will not have a deleterious
impact on firm B’s period-2 market share. If condition (9) is satisfied with dQ^
2
A
dQ1A
> 0, however,
policy makers would face a dilemma: policies designed to induce the increase in QA
1 needed to
induce entry by firm B will also dampen firm B’s period-2 market share. This could be
problematic, if policy makers are concerned that the subsidized firm could wield long-term
market power.
3.3 Firm A’s Period-1 Decisions (Date 2)
If firm A decides to enter the market in period 1, it sets QA
1 at Date 2. When firm A considers its
period-1 output decision, it realizes that some values of QA
1 will deter firm B’s entry, while
others will facilitate entry. We examine this decision by defining ID to be the set of values of
QA
1 for which firm B finds it profitable to enter in period 2 (and the two firms function as
duopolists). In contrast, firm B’s entry is deterred and firm A continues to operate as a
monopolist if firm A’s period-1 output choice belongs to the complement of set ID, which is
denoted by IM. When the goods produced by the two firms are strategic complements, the set
ID consists of all values of QA
1 that exceed some threshold level. The structure of the two sets
can be more complex when the goods produced by firms A and B are substitutes, as detailed
below.
8 In this part and what follows, we implicitly assume that firm B’s entry cost is not so high as to prevent its entry
for any level of firm A’s period-1 output.
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Because firm A realizes that QA
1 may facilitate or deter B’s subsequent entry, it compares the
level of C that would maximize its profits if it remains a monopolist with the output level that
would maximize its profits if firm B entered. Firm A’s two-period stream of profits (assuming a
zero discount rate) for QA
1 ∈ ID is
πD Q1A; v; S
 
≡ RA Q1A ; 0
 
þ vQ1A þ S−c1A Q1A
 
−EA
h i
þ RA Q^
2
A Q
1
A
 
; Q^
2
B Q
1
A
  
−c2A Q^
2
A Q
1
A
 
;Q1A
  	
ð10Þ
Alternatively, if firm B stays out (QA
1 ∈ IM), firm A’s two-period stream of profits is
πM Q1A; v; S
 
≡ RA Q1A ; 0
 
þ vQ1A þ S−c1A Q1A
 
−EA
h i
þ RA Q
2
A Q
1
A
 
; 0
 
−c2A Q^
2
A Q
1
A
 
;Q1A
  	
ð11Þ
where Q
1
A is the optimal output if firm A is a monopolist in period 2.
Let Q^
1
A vð Þ≡argmaxQ1A ≥0 πD Q
1
A; v; S
 
denote the level of output that firm A would
choose if it were certain that firm B would enter the market in period 2, irrespective of
its period-1 output. Also, let Q
1
A vð Þ≡argmaxQ1A ≥0 πM Q
1
A; v; S
 
denote the level of output
that firm A would choose if it were certain that firm B would stay out of the market in
period 2, irrespective of its period-1 output. On some occasions, we subsume the
dependence of Q^
1
A vð ÞandQ
1
A vð Þ on the per-unit subsidy to preserve compactness of the
formulas. In what follows, we denote the duopoly and monopoly outputs as Q^
1
A andQ
1
A,
respectively. We examine these Bunconditional^ profit functions and the corresponding
optimal choices to facilitate the subsequent analysis of the equilibrium behavior. Firm A’s
first period equilibrium output may differ from both Q^
1
A andQ
1
A because firm B’s entry
decision creates a discontinuity in firm A’s profit function. Firm A’s optimal output level
in period 1 is given by
argmaxQ1A∈IM π
M Q1A; v; S
 
; if maxQ1A∈IM π
M Q1A; v; S
 
≥maxQ1A∈ID π
D Q1A; v; S
 
argmaxQ1A∈ID π
D Q1A; v; S
 
; if maxQ1A∈IM π
M Q1A; v; S
 
<maxQ1A∈ID π
D Q1A; v; S
 
(
ð12Þ
where v represents a variable subsidy and S represents a lump sum subsidy. We focus on
the case in which the sets ID and IM are both bounded intervals and the unique boundary
of the two sets is given by the unique9 positive solution ~Q
1
A to:
RB Q^
2
A Q
1
A
 
; Q^
2
B Q
1
A
  
−cB Q^
2
B Q
1
A
 
;Q1A
 
−EB ¼ 0 ð13Þ
Under (13), firm B is indifferent between staying out and entering the market in
period 2. The boundary ~Q
1
A is independent of both the lump-sum and per-unit subsidies,
because firm B will not receive either subsidy. The relationship between Q^
1
A andQ
1
A is
characterized in
9 The solution may not be unique. We assume uniqueness to streamline the discussion.
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Lemma 3: Relationship between the monopoly and duopoly output levels
(a) If the goods are complements then Q
1
A≤Q^
1
A.
(b) If the goods are substitutes then
(b-i) If
∂Q^2B Q
1
A
 
∂Q1A
≥0, then Q^
1
A≤Q
1
A.
(b-ii) If
∂Q^2B Q
1
A
 
∂Q1A
< 0, the relationship between Q^
1
A andQ
1
A is ambiguous.
Proof: See Appendix
We use Lemma 3 to explore whether a fixed subsidy that induces pioneer entry by firm A
can ensure that firm Awill choose QA
1 that will induce subsequent entry by firm B. Figure 1a–c
illustrate the logic for the case in which the two firms produce complementary goods, and
Fig. 2a–c illustrate the logic for the case in which the outputs of the two firms are substitute
goods. The relative positions of the duopoly and monopoly profit functions, πD(QA
1; v, S)
and πM(QA
1; v, S), are determined by the market relationship between the two firms’ outputs.
The profit function πD lies above πM when the two firms sell complementary goods, and the
relationship is reversed when the firms sell substitutes. The bold sections of the profit curves
represent firm A’s profit, after accounting for firm B’s entry decision.
3.3.1 Complements
When the goods are strategic complements, firm B’s profit is a positive function of QA
1 (from
Lemma 2). Therefore, firm B will enter if and only if firm A’s period-1 output is sufficiently
large. Thus, the sets ID and IM are defined as ID ¼ ~Q1A; Z
h i
and IM ¼ 0; ~Q1A
h i
, where Z is the
upper bound of the feasible first-period outputs. Three scenarios, which are defined by the
relationships among Q^
1
A; Q
1
A and ~Q
1
A, are illustrated in Fig. 1a–c. If Q^
1
A≥ ~Q
1
A, firm A’s optimal
output will induce subsequent entry by firm B, and the two firms will be Cournot duopolists in
period 2. In this case, the value of QA
1 that maximizes firm A’s profit Bunintentionally^
stimulates firm B entry, as illustrated in Fig. 1a. If Q^
1
A <
~Q
1
A, however, firm A will compare
the maximum monopoly profits, given by πM Q
1
A; v; S
 
, with its duopoly profit
πD Q
1
A; v; S
 
. Two additional outcomes are possible when Q^
1
A <
~Q
1
A, depending on the
relationship between πM Q
1
A; v; S
 
and πD Q
1
A; v; S
 
, as illustrated in Fig. 1b and c. If
πM Q
1
A; v; S
 
< πD ~Q
1
A; v; S
 
, firm Awill Bintentionally^ induce entry of firm B by produc-
ing ~Q
1
A (see Fig. 1b). However, if π
M Q
1
A; v; S
 
< πD ~Q
1
A; v; S
 
, as illustrated in Fig. 1c, firm
A will produce Q
1
A in period 1 and Bunintentionally^ deter entry by firm B. This will occur
when the degree of complementarity between the two goods is relatively low.
Note that that a fixed subsidy does not affect which of the above three cases materializes.
Instead, the occurrence of case a, b or c is determined by the relationship between the level of
Fig. 1 a: Firm A’s profit as a function of its period-1 production: complements and firm A Bunintentionally^
stimulates firm B’s entry. b: Firm A’s profit as a function of its period-1 production: complements and firm A
Bintentionally^ stimulates firm B’s entry. c: Firm A’s profit as a function of its period-1 production: complements
and firm A Bunintentionally^ deters firm B’s entry
b
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period-one output that maximizes the pioneer’s profit and the level of period-one output at
which the potential entrant’s profit is equal to zero. Hence, a fixed subsidy by itself will not
necessarily induce subsequent entry – even when the firms produce complementary goods.
When firm A maximizes profit by setting QA
1 at a level that deters firm B’s subsequent entry, it
will be necessary to augment the fixed subsidy with a variable subsidy, as discussed below in
Section 3.4.
3.3.2 Substitutes
For the case of substitutes, πD lies below πM because firm B’s output competes with the
pioneer’s output. We consider two configurations of the sets ID and IM: in the first scenario,
IM ¼ 0; ~Q1A
h i
andID ¼ ~Q1A; Z
h i
so that firm B enters if and only if firm A’s period-1 output
is sufficiently large; and in the second scenario, ID ¼ 0; ~Q1A
h i
and IM ¼ ~Q1A; Z
h i
and
IM ¼ ~Q1A; Z
h i
. The analysis of the first scenario echoes the discussion presented above for
complementary goods; hence the details are omitted.
We focus, therefore, on the case in which firm B enters if and only if firm A’s period-1
output is sufficiently small; ID ¼ 0; ~Q1A
h i
andIM ¼ ~Q1A; Z
h i
. As illustrated in Fig. 2a, when
~Q
1
A; ≤Q
1
A, firm A will set its period-1 output equal to the monopoly level Q
1
A. In this case,
firm A’s actions are identical to the Bbusiness as usual^ behavior where firm A does not face
potential competition in period 2 and it has a monopoly position in both periods. Firm B is
Bunintentionally^ deterred by firm A’s actions.
Figure 2b depicts the case in which ~Q
1
A > Q
1
A andπ
M ~Q
1
A; v; S
 
> πD ~Q
1
A; v; S
 
. In this
case, firm A cannot enjoy a monopoly position by choosing Q
1
A. Instead, firm A chooses
between either producing Q^
1
A and earning the duopoly profit, or deterring entry by producing
any quantity greater than ~Q
1
A and earning the monopoly profit. Because the monopoly profit in
Fig. 2b exceeds the duopoly profit, firm A will Bintentionally^ deter firm B’s entry. Thus,
pioneer entry spurred by a fixed subsidy will not generate subsequent entry by firm B in the
cases depicted in Fig. 2a and b.
However, firm A will Bunintentionally^ stimulate entry of firm B when ~Q
1
A > Q
1
A andπ
M
~Q
1
A; v; S
 
> πD ~Q
1
A; v; S
 
(see Fig. 2c). In this case, a one-time lump-sum subsidy will be
sufficient to jump-start a multi-firm industry.
In summary, firm B’s period-2 profit is a function of firm A’s period-1 output. There is no
guarantee that firm Awill elect to produce a level of period-1 output that will induce second-
period entry by firm B. Firm A may deter subsequent entry of both competitors and firm
providing complementary goods, and this deterrence may result from non-strategic Cournot-
maximization of profit.
Fig. 2 a: Firm A’s profit as a function of its period-1 production: substitutes and firm A Bunintentionally^ deters
firm B’s entry. b: Firm A’s profit as a function of its period-1 production: substitutes and firm A Bintentionally^
deters firm B’s entry. c: Firm A’s profit as a function of its period-1 production: substitutes and firm A
Bunintentionally^ stimulates firm B’s entry
b
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3.4 Subsidy Design: A Fixed Subsidy, Augmented with a Per-Unit Subsidy or Tax
(Date 1)
These results raise the question, can the government successfully jumpstart a multi-firm
industry by augmenting the lump sum subsidy with a per-unit subsidy? To analyze this
question, we now suppose that the government deploys two policy instruments, a per-unit
subsidy and a lump sum subsidy, and it intentionally restricts the use of these subsidies to the
first period. While the lump sum subsidy will only impact firm A’s entry decision, the variable
subsidy v has four effects10 on the social welfare in periods 1 and 2, through its effect on QA
1:
& v affects producer and consumer surplus in period 1,
& v affects Blearning^, which has a direct effect on social welfare in period 2, through its
impact on period-2 production costs,
& v affects Blearning^ which has an indirect effect on social welfare in period 2, through its
effect on the potential strategic interaction between firms A and B in period 2, and
& v affects social welfare in period 2, through its impact on the duopoly vs. monopoly market
structure in period 2.
From the perspective of the first and second effects, the government has an incentive to
choose a per-unit subsidy over a per-unit tax. The direction of the third effect depends on
whether Blearning^ fosters or hinders competition11 in period 2. We focus only on the fourth
effect due to space considerations and because addition of an extra firm to the market is likely
to have a greater impact on welfare than changes associated with variation in the output of a
single firm.
To analyze the government’s ability to jump-start a multi-firm industry we use Fig. 3 and
refer back to Figs. 1c, 2a and b. An increase in the variable subsidy v will cause both profit
curves πM ~Q
1
A; v; S
 
andπD ~Q
1
A; v; S
 
to shift upward leaving unchanged the threshold level
~Q
1
A. The shift in each profit function is equal to v ⋅QA
1 > 0. Therefore, the upward shifts of the
profit functions that result from increasing v increase with QA
1, and the magnitudes of the
vertical shifts in the two profit functions are equal for any given level of QA
1. It also follows
from the functional forms for πM ~Q
1
A; v; S
 
andπD ~Q
1
A; v; S
 
that both Q^
1
A and Q
1
A increase in
response to an increase in v. These observations have important implications for firm A’s entry
deterring behavior and the government’s ability to induce entry of firm B.
First, consider the case of strategic complements (see Fig. 1a–c). If firm A’s profit function
has the form depicted in Fig. 1a or b when v = 0, then firm B will enter the market in period 2
and, hence, there will be no need for the government to supplement a lump sum subsidy with a
per unit subsidy. An appropriately chosen fixed subsidy S will be sufficient to induce entry by
firm A, and that entry will stimulate subsequent entry by firm B. Consider now the case
depicted in Figs. 1c and 3. In this case, an increase in the per-unit subsidy v will result in an
upward shift of point πD ~Q
1
A; v; S
 
that exceeds the upward shift of monopoly profit for
output levels in IM ¼ 0; ~Q1A
h i
. Hence, the government can induce the duopoly outcome by
10 In our discussion, we abstract away from the shadow cost of raising public funds to jump-start a multi-firm
industry.
11 If Blearning^ by the two firms is disproportionate then a per-unit subsidy in period 1 may inhibit competition.
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providing a sufficiently large per-unit subsidy to the pioneer entrant. The logic is analogous
when the goods produced by the two firms are substitutes and IM ¼ 0; ~Q1A
h i
and
ID ¼ 0; ~Q1A
h i
; hence the government can jump-start a multi-firm industry by instituting a
sufficiently large period-1 per-unit subsidy.
We now turn to the case of strategic substitutes with ID ¼ 0; ~Q1A
h i
and IM ¼ ~Q1A; Z
h i
(see
Fig. 2a–c). Under this scenario, firm B’s profit is a decreasing function of QA
1, because a
relatively large share of the learning is internal to the pioneer firm (see part (b) of Lemma 2),
and the degree of substitution between the two goods is high relative to the proportion of
learning that is shared. First, consider the case depicted in Fig. 2a and suppose that the
government introduces a period-1 per-unit tax. This will result in leftward shifts of both Q^
1
A
and Q
1
A. Furthermore, the curves π
D(⋅; v, S) and πM(⋅; v, S) will shift downward and proportion-
ately to the output level at which they are evaluated. Since period-1 output levels that induce
duopoly are lower than the output levels that result in a monopoly, the duopoly outcome will
become more attractive as the per-unit tax increases. For a sufficiently large per-unit tax the
duopoly outcome will entail a larger profit. Note, however, that per-unit taxes that can make
the duopoly outcome more attractive may be so large that the pioneer firm will prefer to stay
out of the market altogether. To prevent such behavior, the government will need to offset the
per-unit tax with a sufficiently large period-1 lump sum subsidy and a requirement that to
qualify for the lump-sum subsidy the pioneer firm will have to produce a period-1 output
above some strictly positive level.
We summarize all of our findings in the following:
Proposition: Feasibility of jump-starting a multi-firm industry.
(a) If the goods produced by the two firms are complements, the government can jump-start
a multi-firm industry by implementing a combination of fixed and variable one-time
subsidies.
MI
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Fig. 3 The impact of an increase in the per-unit subsidy from v’ to v^: complements
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(b) If the goods produced by the two firms are substitutes, the government may need to
impose an additional requirement.
(b-i) If, IM ¼ 0; ~Q1A
h i
and ID ¼ ~Q1A; Z
h i
then the government can jump-start a multi-
firm industry by implementing a sufficiently high period-1 per-unit subsidy to the
pioneer entrant.
(b-ii) If, ID ¼ 0; ~Q1A
h i
and IM ¼ ~Q1A; Z
h i
then the government can jump-start a multi-
firm industry by implementing a sufficiently high period-1 per-unit tax to the
pioneer entrant balanced by a sufficiently large lump-sum subsidy and a require-
ment that the pioneer firm needs to produce period-1 output above some strictly
positive level.
When the goods produced by the two firms are complements, a fixed subsidy will be
sufficient to jump-start a multi-firm industry if the degree of complementarity between the two
goods is high. Otherwise, it will be necessary to augment the fixed subsidy with an additional
variable subsidy.
Two scenarios are possible for the case of substitutes; firm B enters only if firm A’s
period-1 output is sufficiently high (part (b-i) of the Proposition), or firm B enters only if
firms A’s period-1 output is sufficiently low (part (b-ii) of the Proposition). In the first
case, a relatively large share of the learning is external so that firm B’s entry occurs only
if QA
1 is sufficiently large. The government intervention can be successful in this case if it
offers a sufficiently high per-unit subsidy.12 The duopoly outcome is more attractive to
firm A in this case because firm A would have to restrict its period-1 output by a
relatively large amount to deter entry of firm B and, as a result, would forego a relatively
large payment associated with the per-unit subsidy. In the second case, the government
will prevent too much production in period 1 by introducing a per-unit tax. To induce
entry by firm A in period 1 the government needs to offset the per-unit tax by a
sufficiently large lump-sum subsidy and a requirement that the pioneer firm needs to
produce period-1 output above some strictly positive level in order to qualify for the
lump-sum subsidy.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
The paper examines coordination and learning market failures that can block development of
an otherwise-profitable industry, and the mechanism by which upfront subsidies could poten-
tially offset the market failures and jump-start the development of a multi-firm industry. The
concept of the jump-start strategy is appealing: if entry is blocked by coordination failures or
learning externalities, the jump-start strategy offers the possibility that the government may be
able to create a new industry by subsidizing an initial entrant – without conferring long-term
market power on that firm. Instead, the coordination and learning externalities created by the
subsidized firm may induce entry by suppliers and customers, to produce the infrastructure
needed to support production of the new good. Development of this infrastructure may induce
subsequent entry by firms that will compete with the subsidized firm, thereby reducing the
12 Note that for some specifications of the model, the optimal per-unit subsidy may be equal to zero so that the
government may jump-start a multi-firm industry by using only a fixed subsidy.
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pioneer’s market power. The possibility that the pioneer’s market power will be short-lived is
particularly enticing when a government is considering jump-starting an industry that will
produce a merit good for domestic consumption. Similarly, the coordination externalities
created by the subsidized firm may induce entry by suppliers.
Our results indicate, however, that this strategy should be viewed with caution. A one-
time fixed subsidy that induces entry by the pioneer firm will not generally be sufficient
to jump-start a multi-firm industry. Augmenting the period-one fixed subsidy with a
period-one per-unit subsidy can induce entry by the pioneer firm and a second entrant, if
the two firms will produce complementary goods. This two-part subsidy strategy can
effectively induce subsequent competitive entry when a large share of the learning is
external. When the firms produce substitutes and a large share of the learning is internal,
the government the jump-start strategy may require offering a sufficiently large per-unit
tax and offsetting it by a sufficiently large lump-sum subsidy.
These results provide a basis for considering whether the jump-start strategy can be
expected to address the potential that the pioneer firm may enjoy lasting market power. While
this issue does not have first-order importance in models that focus on the development of
export industries, it is salient when the new industry will produce merit goods for the domestic
economy. This problem has not been addressed in the models that focus on the development of
export industries, because the consumers who will pay the monopoly prices are not located in
the home country. However, this issue is salient when the new industry will produce merit
goods for the domestic economy.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Totally differentiating the equations in (2), we obtain:
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Note that M > 0 by the stability condition which was assumed to hold.
First, consider the case of complementary goods (case (a) in Lemma 1). Using
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1
A
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≥0. Proof of case (b) follows directly from (A1) and M > 0. QED
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Proof of Lemma 3: Differentiating (10) and (11) and using the first-order conditions for the
choice in period 2 we obtain implicit expressions for Q^
1
A and Q
1
A, respectively:
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A
 
∂Q1A
¼ 0: ðA3Þ
Evaluating the derivative of ∂πD(QA1; v, S) at Q
1
A and using (A2) we obtain:
∂πD Q
1
A; v; S
 
∂Q1A
¼
∂c2A Q
2
A Q
1
A
 
;Q
1
A
 
∂Q1A
−
∂c2A Q^
2
A Q
1
A
 
;Q
1
A
 
∂Q1A
þ
∂RA Q^
2
A Q
1
A
 
; Q^
2
B Q
1
A
  
∂Q2B
∂Q^
2
B Q
1
A
 
∂Q1A
: ðA4Þ
First, consider the case of complementary goods. The inequality Q
2
A Q
1
A
 
≤Q^
2
A Q
1
A
 
and
convexity of cA
2 in its first argument imply that ∂c2A Q
2
A Q
1
A
 
;Q
1
AÞ
∂Q1A−∂c
2
A Q^
2
A Q
1
A
  ;Q1AÞ
∂Q1A ≥0
. Further-
more, ∂RA Q^
2
A Q
1
A
 
;Q^
2
B Q
1
A
 
Þ
∂Q2B ≥0
. Combined with the result from Lemma 1, that
∂Q^2B Q
1
A
 
∂Q1A
≥0 for
the case of complements, this implies that
∂πM Q
1
A;v;S
 
∂Q1A
≥0. Hence, Q1A≤Q^
1
A.
Suppose now that firms A and B produce substitute goods. The inequality Q
2
A Q
1
A
 
≥Q^
2
A
Q
1
A
 
implies that ∂c2A Q
2
A Q
1
A
 
;Q
1
AÞ
∂Q1A−∂c
2
A Q^
2
A Q
1
A
  ;Q1AÞ
∂Q1A ≤0
. Furthermore, ∂RA Q^
2
A Q
1
A
 
;Q^
2
B Q
1
A
 
Þ
∂Q2B ≤0
.
Hence, if
∂Q^2B Q
1
A
 
∂Q1A
≥0; then
∂πD Q
1
A;v;S
 
∂Q1A
is unambiguously negative, which implies Q
1
A≥Q^
1
A.
However, when
∂Q^
2
B Q
1
A
 
∂Q1A
≤0;
∂πD Q
1
A;v;S
 
∂Q1A
has an ambiguous sign. QED
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